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In the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah 
Ben Hansen, Clifford Erickson, T. M. 
Wells, Arson Brotherson, Percy 
Axelsen, Harvey Oviatt, Claude 
Erickson, B. H. Erickerson, Oliver 
Cramer, W. F. Oviatt, Dee Oviatt, 
Merrill Day, Lavar Atwood, Sam N. 
Alger, S. Nelson Alger, Afton Al-
ger, William Winders, I. K. Wells, 
Oran Wilson and C. F. Jones, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
Board of Education of Emery County 
School District, a public corpora-
tion, Soren Anderson, E. M. Craw-
ford, L. C. Maharry, I. K. Williams 
and Ervin Franklin, 
Appellants. 
'R_espondents' · {!Jrief 
I. INTRODUCTIOIN 
No. 6313 
We agree with defendants (Brief, p. 9) that the chief 
issue on this appeal is whether or not the court was right 
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in overruling defendants' demurrer to plaintiffs' petition. 
That petition sets forth two causes of action, the first of 
which involves the power of the school board to abandon the 
Elmo school. When the trial court overruled defendants' 
demurer to this first cause of action it in reality disposed 
of the entire law suit. The rulings as to the second cause of 
action and as to plaintiffs' demurrer to the defendants' 
answer were correct but were not essential to a disposition 
of the case. In other words, the trial court in its first ruling 
held as a matter of law that the Emery County School Board 
had no power to abandon the Elmo school. If there is no 
power to abandon then the reasonableness or unreasonable-
ness of the steps leading to the abandonment is immaterial. 
The question of the use or abuse of discretion can only be 
considered where there is power to act. 
Plaintiffs would have been driven to rely upon their 
second cause of action and to resist defendants' answer only 
in the event the trial court held against them on the first 
cause of action. The situation is the same on this appeal. 
If this honorable court sustains the trial court in its ajudi-
cation that the Emery County School Board was without 
power to close the Elmo school, there will be no purpose in 
considering the allegations in plaintiffs' second cause of 
action and in defendants' answer. 
We shall proceed, nevertheless, to examine the authori-
ties and answer the arguments of defendants in full. Be-
cause, however, of the existence of the two fundamental is-
sues in this entire problem as above indicated, the one of 
statutory power and the other of the use or abuse of discre-
tion, we shall follow the theory of plaintiffs' pleadings in 
our argument rather than commingle these issues. 
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II. EMERY COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD WITHOUT POW-
ER TO DISCONTINUE ELMO SCHOOL. (HEREIN 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AND 
ALL SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS IN CONNEC-
TION THEREWITH). 
Inasmuch as the board of education is a creation of the 
legislature, our first problem is one of statutory construc-
tion, and in particular a construction of R. S. Utah, 1933, 
75-11-20. The following authorities disclose the governing 
canons with respect to the interpretation of such statutes. 
School boards are sometimes denominated quasi-corpor-
ations with very limited powers. The general proposition is 
clearly stated in McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 1, 
Sec. 113, p. 277: 
"Municipal corporations distinguished from 
school districts. Boards of education or school dis-
tricts rank low in the grade of corporate existence, 
and, hence, are properly denominated quasi-corpor-
ations. They possess only limited powers and small 
corporate life. As declared in a New Hampshire 
case: 'School districts are quasi-corporations of the 
most limited powers known to the law. They have 
no powers derived from usage. They have the pow-
ers expressly granted to them, and such implied 
powers as are necessary to enable them to perform 
their duties and no more.' Likewise, in an early 
Massachusetts case: 'That they are not· bodies 
politic and corporate with the general power of 
corporations, must be admitted; and the reasoning 
advanced to show their defect of power is conclu-
sive.' " 
School districts do not possess the governmental attrib-
utes of municipalities: 
"They have been held to be bodies of a lower 
grade, with less power than cities, fewer of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
characteristics of private corporations, and more 
of mere agencies. of the state. They possess only 
the administrative powers that are granted by the 
central government or inferred by necessary impli-
cation." Wilson v. School District of Philadelphia, 
.•... Pa ...... , 195 A. 90, 113 A. L. R. 1401, p. 
1406. 
The law is well stated in one of the cases cited 
by defendants: 
"The school district is not a municipal corpora-
tion. It is very grudgingly accorded the rank of a 
quasi-municipal corporation. McQuillin on Municip-
al Corporations, 112; 24 R. C. L. p. 564. It is but 
the agent of the state for the sole purpose of ad-
ministering the state's system of public education, 
and has only such powers as are conferred express-
ly or by necessary implication." Iverson v. Union 
Free High School, ..... Wis ...... 202 N. W. 788 
at p. 792. 
Our own Supreme Court in Beard v. Board of Education, 
81, Utah· 51, 16 P. (2d) 900 at page 903 has enunciated the 
controlling principle as follows: 
"The board of education, being a creation of 
the legislature, has only such powers as are ex-
pressly conferred upon it and such implied powers 
as are necessary to execute and carry into effect its 
express powers." 
The statutory grant of power is at once a grant and a 
limitation: 
"The statute granting the power must be re-
garded both as a grant and a limitation upon the 
powers of the board." MeN air v School Dist. of Cas-
cade County ...•. Mont ...... , 288, p. 189. 
Moreover, any ambiguity or reasonable doubt with re-
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spect to the powers claimed is to be resolved against the 
grant: 
"Any doubt as to the existence or possession 
of a particular power, or any ambiguity in the 
terms of the grant, should ordinarily be resolved 
against the power and in favor of the people." 56 C. 
J. 332. 
The State of Utah is committed to the foregoing rule: 
"It is a general rule that a municipal corpora-
tion has only such powers as are expressly granted, 
or essential thereto, or plainly implied therein. I 
Dill. Mun. Corp., Sec. 89, 91. And where there is a 
doubt as to the existence of their authority, such 
doubt is resolved against the corporation." Ogden 
City v. McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387 16 P. 721. 
"Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt con-
cerning the existence of power is resolved by the 
courts against the corporation, and the power is 
denied." Quoted with approval in Salt Lake City, 
v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234. 
"The tendency of municipal government [and 
we interpolate-of school boards] to arrogate to it-
self power, and to encroach upon the right of its 
citizens, has led to the establishment of salutary 
rules of construction, limiting their powers to those 
expressly granted or arising by reasonable and ne-
cessary implication from the grant." Quoted with 
approval in Pettit v Duke 10 Utah 311, 37 P. 568. 
See also: American Fork v Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 
249, Lund v Salt Lal{e County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510. 
Our Utah statutes must be interpreted in the light of 
the foregoing salutary principles of construction. Wherein 
is the Emery County School Board granted express or im-
plied power to abandon and destroy the Elmo School? 
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There is no express power. The defendants so confess 
(Brief, p. 12). 
There is no implied power. General powers of school 
boards are defined in R. S. Utah, 1933, 75-11-20. The sec-
tion begins with the declaratio,n that "every board of edu-
cation shall have power and authority to purchase and sell 
schoolhouse sites and improvements thereon, to construct 
and erect school buildings and to furnish the same, to estab-
lish, locate and maintain 'kindergart~n schools, common 
schools consisting of primary and grammar grades, high 
schools and industrial or manual training schools"; the 
board may support libraries and procure necessary school 
apparatus; supply books to pupils; jointly maintain and 
operate one or more schools with an adjoining school dis-
trict; assign students to the state school of education for 
the purpose of illustrating instruction; and the section con-
cludes with the general statement that a school board "may 
do all things needful for the maintenance, prosperity and 
success of the schools and the promotion of education." 
This section grants to boards of education the power 
to establish, locate and maintain. schools. Of course, it can 
sell school house sites and improvements thereon in the 
manner provided in Section 75-11-21, but the building is 
only the shell and this portion of the section does not em-
power the discontinuance or change of the school which is 
quite a different thing from the school building. 
We repeat that no powers is granted in the section to 
abandon and· destroy a school nor is any such power im-
plied. Elmo school had long been in existence when the 
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Emery County School District was organized. The school 
board merely took over the operation and maintenance of 
the Elmo school in place of the old board of trustees. If the 
legislature intended to grant the power claimed by defend-
ants why did it not do so-why did it not employ the words 
"relocate," "remove," "change," or "discontinue," or their 
equivalent? Utah legislative history is instructive in this 
connection. Section 1816 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1907, granted to school district boards the following power: 
1816. To ntaintain, locate, or discontinue 
schools. It shall organize, maintain and conven-
iently locate schools for the education of the child-
ren of school age within the district, or change or 
discontinue any of them according to law." (Un 
derscore added) . 
The words in this section preceding the underscored por-
tion, with the exception of the caption, are substantially 
the same as the words in the present Utah law, namely, "to 
establish, locate and maintain." But this language was 
deemed to be insufficient by the Utah legislature and so 
it added the underscored portion. Our legislature clearly 
manifested in the writing of that section that the words 
"organize, maintain and conveniently locate" did not imply 
the power to discontinue or change. To "establish, locate 
and maintain" is one grant; to "maintain, locate or discon-
tinue" is quite a different power. Section 1825, Compiled 
Laws of Utah 1907 went on to provide "that any school may 
be discontinued when the average attendance of pupils there-
in for twenty consecutive days shall be less than eight, or 
when \vith the consent of a majority of the patrons of such 
school, proper and convenient school facilities can be pro-
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vided for the pupils in some other school." This statute 
was construed in the case of State ex rei. Bishop v. More-
house et al., Trustees of Fish Springs, 38 Utah 234, 112 P~ 
169. Even this small statutory power to abandon has now 
been withdrawn from Utah school boards. That fact is sig-
nificant. The further significance of the foregoing legis-
lative history is that our legislature well knows how to ex-
pressly grant power to a school board to dis.continue or 
change a school if it chooses to delegate that power and 
secondly, that it did not imply this power in the words, 
"establish, locate and maintain." 
The concluding part of R. S. Utah 1933, 75-11-20, that 
the school board "may do all things needful for the main-
tenance, prosperity and success of the schools and the pro-
motion of education" is of course to be construed in the light 
of the entire section. It does not enlarge the grant. It is 
a rule of statutory construction that the enumeration of cer-
tain powers in a statute followed by a grant of general pow-
ers, as in this section, is not an enlargement of the grant. 
Or to state it in the reverse, the general grant at the close 
of the statute is limited to the objects and purposes stated 
in the first part of the statute. 
Other sections of our present law are instructive as to 
the legislative intent manifested in 75-11-20. Section 75-
11-21 provides that school boards cannot even sell the school 
house or school site without the affirmative vote of two-
thirds of the board membership. Now the school house, as 
above stated, is not the school-it is merely its shell or 
envelop as is pointed out in Gollnick v Luedtke, ..... S. D., 
• . . . ., 187 N. W. 542, at p. 543. Yet under defendants' 
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theory of the Utah school system our school boards can 
change or discontinue a school by a bare majority vote of 
the board but cannot dispose of the school shell without a 
two-thirds vote. Surely this was not the intent of the leg-
islature. A collation of the Utah statutes with reference 
to district school boards refutes the contention of defend-
ants. The Utah legislature was more concerned over the 
removal of a school than the sale of a school house. It made 
specific provision for the latter case; it withheld its declara-
tion as to the former. Since the power has not been granted 
to the school board it does not exist in the school board. It 
rests with the legislature whether this power should be 
relinquished to school boards and if so under what terms 
and conditions. 
And it must be remembered that if there is any sub-
stantial doubt as to the existence of the power claimed, that 
doubt must be resolved in favor of the people and against 
the grant. 
Defendants' argument that under our existing school 
laws Utah school boards are clothed with almost unlimited 
power (Brief p. 12) is, in this writer's opinion, a good 
statement of the sentiment of some Utah school adminis-
trators rather than a good statement of the law as set forth 
in the Utah statutes above. 
Nor do the cases cited by defendants sustain their 
sweeping contentions. We shall review these as well as 
other cases under state headings. 
Utah: Defendants first cite (Brief, p. 12), Beard v 
Board of Education, supra. This is the North Summit case 
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involving the power of a Board to permit a high school to 
be used for extra curricular activities. The Board was up-
held since such activites were declared to be educatonal. 
The court cited two sections of Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, 
the first, Sec. 4598, to the effect that "all public schools and 
school property therein shall be under the direction and con-
trol of the board of education" and the second, Sec. 4617, 
our present 75-11-20 above quoted. It thereupon makes the 
statement quoted by defendants that these sections vest the 
control of schools and school property in boards of educa-
tion. The portion of the first statute quoted, Sec. 4598, is 
no longer found in our statutes with respect to district 
boards and so the ·Court's statement as to the combined 
force of these two statutes is now of acedemic interest only. 
Moreover, the statement when given was appropos only as 
to the use of high school buildings for extra curricular ac-
tivities. Anything beyond this was dicta. The case of 
State ex rei. Bishop v. Morehouse et al, supra, was handed 
down at a time when school boards were given power under 
specified conditions to remove a school. That statute has 
also been repealed. 
Although numerous Utah school cases have been re-
corded, we have been unable to find one involving the issue 
raised by this appeal. All of the Utah cases, however, stand 
for the proposition that school boards have only the express 
powers conferred by statute and such implied powers as are 
necessary to carry the express powers into effect. 
Montana: Compare the Utah statute with the statute 
in the case of State v. Desonia, 215 P. 220, (App. Brief, p. 
13). Section 1010 provides: 
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"That the trustees of any school district in the 
state of Montana when they shall dee-m it for the 
best interest of all pupils residing within such dis-
trict, may close their school and send pupils of the 
district to another district." p. 221. 
The Montana legislature, unlike Utah, thereby expressly 
vested power and discretion in its school trustees to discon-
tinue schools. This case is not, therefore, authoritative for 
defendants because of the total dissimilarity of the respec-
tive statutes. See also Nichols v. School Dist., No. 3 of Ra-
valli County, et al., 287 P. 624, where the- statute provided 
that school sites. should not be sold or located by the school 
board except upon the direction of a majority of the elect-
ors of the district. MeN air v School District of Cascade 
County, has been cited supra for its relevant pronouncement. 
Oregon: In McBee v. School District 96 P. (2d) 207, 
cited by defendants (Brief, p. 15) the statute contains an 
express grant of power: 
"It shall require a vote of two-thirds of the 
voters present and voting at such meeting to order 
the removal of the school house." p. 210. 
This statute and the one construed in Lumijarvi et al v. 
School Dist. No. 25 of Columbia County, et al., 229 _P. 684 
are wholly unlike the Utah statutes. 
Kansas: In Mathews v. Rural High School Dist. No. 5 
of Johnson and Miami Counties et al., 242 P. 1016, the 
statutes provide that the establishing of high school dis-
tricts and the locating of high schools are to be determined 
by vote of the electors. 
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California: California allows school boards to change 
schools in incorporated cities and towns but not elsewhere 
except upon the vote of two-thirds of the qualified electors 
of the district. Lawson v. Turlock Union lligh School Dis-
trict et al., 190 P. 1055. When the Utah legislature gets 
ready to further legislate upon this subject it may choose to 
grant different powers to city school boards than to county 
school boards. Conditions in Salt Lake City and in sparsely 
settled Emery County are unlike. Indeed, it may be that 
our legislature already has made a distinction along these 
lines in the enactment of R. S .. Utah, 1933, 75-9-5, which 
provides, pursuant to Article X, Section 6 of our state con-
stitution, that the public school system in cities of the first 
and second -class shall be. controlled by the Board of educa-
tion of such cities. There is no similar grant to other boards 
of education in Utah. The California court in upholding 
the constitutionality of their statute requiring a vote of the. 
electors for a removal in country districts and not in urban 
centers, states as follows: 
"In the country, a removal to a new location, 
miles distant from a former site might inconveni-
ence large numbers of pupils, while, ordinarily, the 
greatest possible removal within a city could not 
greatly inconvenience anyone. In the country, seri-
ous or dangerous obstacles to travel, even though 
the removal be for only a short distance, might 
operate to deny the benefits of the school to many 
persons, while such a result is scarcely possible in a 
city." p. 1056. 
Nebraska: So in Nebraska two systems of adminis-
tration prevailed-one as to urban and one as to rural school 
districts. In the former the board had ultimate control as 
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to the removal of schools, whereas in the latter the electors 
had ultimate control. The statute as to the former pro-
vides that the "affairs of the school district shall be con-
ducted exclusively by boards of education," and the court 
held that when a provisio to this section allowing a referen-
dum on the decisions of the board was repealed that the 
board then had plenary authority. Gaddis v. School District 
139 N. W. 280. This case, cited by defendants (Brief, p. 19), 
is really an authority against them. The other Nebraska 
case cited (Brief, p. 19), Bay State v. Bing, 71 N. W. 311, is 
not relevant. The statute merely conferred_ upon the school 
superintendent the power to divide the county into school 
districts and had nothing to do with the location or removal 
of schools. This statute is quoted at page 311 of the report. 
Missouri : Missouri on the other hand has made a dis-
tinction betvveen elementary grades in city and consolidated 
districts and in all other districts. See Crow et al. v Consoli-
dated School Dist., Springfield Court of Appeals, 36 S. W. 
(2d) 676 for the first type and State ex rei. Miller et al v 
Board of Education, 21 S. W. (2d) 645, for the latter. The 
first case is the written opinion of an intermediate appellate 
court and involves a Missouri statute which was held to con-
fer removing power upon the board. The second case con-
strued a Missouri statute granting the board the power to 
remove elementary grades only when the average attend-
ance fell below ten. This also is a distinction the Utah leg-
islature may elect to consider when the school administrat-
ors go before it to ask for the power they now endeavor to 
usurp. The people of Utah may well be satisfied to grant 
plenary power to their boards of education to remove high 
schools but not elementary schools. The older students 
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can more or less take care of themselves. But the transpor-
tation of infants of five years and upwards by bus over long 
distances and into other towns, often in inclement weather, 
there to remain away from the care and watchfulness of 
their parents for the major portion of the day, is quite an-
other proposition. Utah, like Missouri, may choose to vest 
the power to the board in one case and withhold it or repose 
it in the local school patrons in the other case. We do not 
say the legislature should not grant some powers to boards 
of education to remove or consolidate schools under certain 
conditions; we merely say they have not done so; and we 
emphatically say that the school administrators should go 
before the legislature in the democratic American fashion 
and ask for such powers as they deem advisable. 
Oklahoma: Some state legislatures have seen fit to 
grant the power to remove schools to boards of independent 
school districts, and to leave the power with the qualified 
electors in common school districts. A case involving the 
first statute is Brooks v Shannon, 86 P. (2d) 792, (App. 
Brief, p. 20). Here the statute gave the board power "to 
maintain and operate a complete public school system of 
such character as the board of education shall deem best 
suited to the needs of the school district." p. 794. The Ok-
lahoma statute providing that in a common school district 
a school could not be removed without a majority vote of 
the electors is construed in Goodwin et al v. Union Graded 
School District, 7 4 P. (2d) 601. See also Stayton v. Butchee 
et al., 82 P. 726, where a vote of electors was a prerequisite. 
North Carolina: In Davenport v Board of Education, 
112 S. E. 246, there w~re two districts within the same coun-
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ty. The building in one was burned, the districts were con-
solidated, and the board transported the high school students 
to the other district for instruction. This was held to be 
proper under North Carolina laws. In School Committee v 
Board of Education, 120 S. E. 202, although the board was 
vested with power to locate a building under the statutes, 
it submitted the matter to the referendum of the school 
patrons. It will be observed that these two cases primarily 
concern the power of the. board to locate school buildings 
rather than to remove or relocate them. 
North Dakota: Here the statute provides that the 
school house could be removed upon vote of electors when 
the proposition was recommended by the board or by peti~ 
tion of one-third of the voters. Hagstrom v Estherville 
School District, 269 N. W. 93. 
Texas: Statute specified that if average daily attend-
ance was 20 or more the board could not abolish school with-
out vote of taxpayers. The attendance was 20 but the board 
refused to hire a teacher and a writ of mandamus was pro-
perly granted. Chastain v Maudlin et al., 32 S. W. (2d) 235. 
South Dakota: Concerning the two South Dakota 
cases cited by defendants, Gollnick v, Luedtke, supra, and 
Dahl v Independent School District, 187 N. W. 638 we point 
out that the first involves a statute providing for the board 
to "s.ell and remove schoolhouses, when lawfully directed by 
the electors of the district," and the second deals with the 
power of the board to transport students and with the prob-
lem of abuse of discretion. 
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West Va: Here there were two provisions of law un-
der which the board operated-one that it had power to es-
tablish graded schools, the other that school facilities must 
be provided by it within two miles from the residence of 
each student. Plaintiff's home was held to be within two 
miles of the graded school. State v. Board of Education, 
94 S.. E. 500 (Cited by Defs. Brief, p. 14). 
Mississippi: The law of this· state empowered the 
school board to make an annual readjustment of the school 
districts and buildings. Sellier v. Dedeaux, 99 S. 439. The 
board at such annual meeting ordered the school removed 
one-half mile from its old location. Defendants' quotation 
from this case (Brief, p. 15) must be read in light of this 
statute. See the case at page 440. 
Indiana: In Davis v Mendenhall, 49 N. E. 1048, the 
statute, as defendants state (Brief, p. 14), vested the school 
trustee with discretionary power to abandon a school. 
The foregoing texts and cases disclose, inter alia, that: 
1. School boards posf?ess only such limited powers as 
are conferred by statute and that any reasonable doubt as 
to the existence of the power is resolved in favor of the peo-
ple and against the grant. 
2. In almost every reported instance where school 
boards have closed or removed schools they have done so 
pursuant to express statutory grant of power. 
3. · State legislatures have been more reluctant to grant 
the power to boards to discontinue elementary and gram-
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mar grades and schools in rural districts than to discontinue 
upper grades and schools in cities and consolidated districts. 
4. The courts have constantly been on guard to hold 
school boards within the limits of their powers. 
Upon a review of these cases and the Utah statutes we 
submit that the trial court was correct in overruling defend-
ants' demurrer to plaintiffs' first cause of action and having 
done so it follows of necessity that plaintiffs' demurrer to 
defendants' answer to the first cause was properly sus-
tained. 
III. EVEN IF IT BE HELD TI-IAT THE EMERY COUNTY 
SCHOOL BOARD HAD PO·WER TO DISCO'NTINUE 
AND ABANDON ONE OF I'TIS SCHO~OL.S ITS. ACTIO·N 
WITH RESPECT TO THE ELMO SC·HOOL WAS AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION (HEREIN PLAINTIFFS' 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AND ALL SUBSE-
QUENT PLEADINGS IN CONNECTION THERE-
WITH.) 
Only in the event that the Supreme Court overrules the 
trial court as to its holdings with respect to the plaintiffs' 
first cause of action will plaintiffs be under necessity of 
establishing that the board's action in removing the Elmo 
school was arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust. Reported 
cases are of less value insofar as this proposition is con-
cerned inasmuch as each case must be decided in light of all 
the facts and circumstances involved. We maintain that 
our second cause of action does state grounds sufficient to 
show an abuse of discretion. Defendants on the other hand 
state that our second cause of action in alleging the action 
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of the defendants to be discrimnatory, arbitrary, unreason-
able and contrary to law pleads merely "a stark legal con-
clusion" and they cite the Missouri case of Corley v. Mont-
gomery, supra, to the effect that such allegations "if unac-
companied by suppo~ting facts, would be merely pleading 
legal conclusions." (Brief, p. 10). The significant point in 
connection with this last mentioned case and with the case 
now on appeal is that said allegations in each instance are 
accompanied by supporting facts. The Missouri court states 
as follows: 
"We do not think the case can be disposed of 
on the ground that the petition, in alleging that the 
attempted discontinuance of the school 'is arbi-
trary, unreasonable, unjust and oppressive' or is 
'unjust unwarranted and illegal' pleads only 
legal conclusions. Of course if there were no facts 
alleged in the petition showing that the threatened 
action was of such character then the above quoted 
words would be no pleading but mere conclusions of 
law. But these so called 'vituperative epithets' are 
not unaccompanied by the statements of facts to 
support them. For instance, the petition alleges 
that the school district has the money to maintain 
the ward school; that great hardships. and incon-
venience will ensue to the pupils of said ward school, 
in that they are in the primary grades and are phy-
sically incapable of going long distances to other 
schools; that they will be subjected to the rigors of 
the winter season and be exposed to danger from 
traffic (no small danger in these days of swift mov-
ing automobiles and careless, not to say drunken, 
drivers); that property has been purchased on the 
faith and on the reliance of the fact that a nearby 
school was and would be maintained, and such 
property will greatly depreciate if the school is dis~ 
continued. Legal conclusions do not harm if they 
~ppear as the result of or are supported by, pleaded 
Issuable facts; but when they are unaccompanied 
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by such facts, then they render the petition de-
murrable." p. 285. 
The facts pleaded in our second cause of action have 
been set forth concisely in the Abstract (pp. 6-9) and in 
Appellants Brief (pp. 1-6). No good purpose will be served 
to restate or even summarize them at this point. The alle-
gations of defendants' answer are likewise recited in the 
Abstract and Brief. We submit that the action of the 
school board in summarily discontinuing the Elmo school 
under the circumstances pleaded constitutes a clear abuse of 
discretion even if the board had the power to act, which 
we deny. 
Schools, like churches, came West in the covered wagons 
of the pioneers. At Elmo there is a four-room brick school 
building of modern design with all necessary furniture and 
equipment for the adequate maintenance of a primary and 
grammar school to serve Elmo town and adjacent territory. 
Elmo town has grown around its school. It is a struggling 
community which needs help rather than discouragement 
in its effort to maintain satisfactory community life for 
adults and children alike. And our Utah law does recognize 
the value of schools to adults notwithstanding defendants' 
argument in connection with Keever v. Board of Education, 
..... G ...... , 3 S. E. 886, and People v. Baird, 307 Ill. 503, 
139 N. E. 132 (Brief, pp. 16-17). R. S. Utah, 1933, 75-22-1, 
provides: 
"There shall be a CIVIC center at all public 
school buildings and grounds where the citizens of 
the respective school districts may engage in super-
vised recreational activities, and where they may 
meet and discuss any and all subjects and ques-
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tions which in their judgment may appertain to 
the educational, political, economic, artistic and 
moral interests of the citizens of the commun-
•t " 1 y ..... 
The Elmo people do not ask for a large school. They 
ask that they be allowed to educate their small children at 
home rather than transport them as far as twenty-five miles 
per day to another town, often under hazardous conditions, 
there to remain from eight to ten hours each day. Defend-
ants answer that it is in the interest of efficiency and econ-
omy to centralize and consolidate. We reply that there are 
certain things which are more fundamental than e~ficiency, 
economy and centralization, among which are the rights of 
parents to watch over and care for their children of tender 
years. Nor is the change in the interest of the children, 
many of whom are made ill when transported by bus over 
such distances and at unusual hours. The need for consoli-
dation of schools and diversification in curricula comes with 
the advanced students. This is proven by the enactments 
of legislatures throughout the United :States as the cases 
cited in this brief attest. Defendants have disregarded this 
fact. They attempted to close the Elmo school, it appears 
to plaintiffs, because Elmo was the smallest school in the 
district and therefore opposition would come from fewer 
people than if they had consolidated two or more of their 
high schools. Our school houses must not become political 
footballs, subject to be kicked from one place to another, 
after each local school board election. 
We agree, of course, that insofar as the question of 
abuse of discretion is concerned each case must be decided 
upon its own facts. This proposition is sustained by the 
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cases hereinabove cited and by other decisions. In such 
cases as Iverson v Union Free High School, supra, and Robb 
v. Stone, .•••. Pa ...... , 146 A. 91, the courts have enjoined 
the action of the boards, the court in the first case declaring: 
"If such caprice and spitework be approved, 
then, when the vicissitudes of politics shall place 
the present minority in control of the district meet-
ing, the site may again be changed, and so on, ad 
libitum, resulting in a pitiful squandering of pub-
lic funds and the crucifixion of the cause of educa-
tion." p. 793. 
In other cases such as Brooks v. Shannon, supra, School Com-
mittee v. Board of Education, supra, Davis v. Mendenhall 
and State v Spokane School Dist., sufficient facts were neith-
er pleaded or proved to warrant the courts interference. 
For example in the last mentioned case the school building 
was removed a distance of only three blocks and the only 
fact established was that the people had built their homes 
with reference to the old building. 
Even on the theory that the Emery County School 
Board possessed the power to abandon a school, it abused 
that power under the circumstances pleaded in this action. 
IV CO·NCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit the following: 
1. There is neither express nor implied power vested 
in the Emery County School Board to discontinue and aband-
on the Elmo school. This conclusion we believe is arrived 
at fairly and without any semblance of hair-splitting statu-
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tory interpretation. Here is an occasion where the salutary 
rules of statutory construction when applied to a determina-
tion of fundamental and far-reaching rights, lead to a just, 
fair and inevitable conclusion in favor of the people. But 
if there should remain any doubt as to whether or not the 
power claimed has been granted, the courts should resolve 
that doubt in favor of the people and against their school 
servants who have temporarily forgotten that they were 
elected to serve the people rather than to rule them. 
2. The defendants as school administrators have been 
misled by their logic. In the first instance they reason that 
the power to discontinue a school must be lodged somewhere, 
therefore it is lodged in them. They are correct in the pre-
mise but wrong in the conclusion. The power is vested in 
the legislature, which may or may not confer it upon others. 
In the second instance they reason that inasmuch as the 
power is not expressly granted to them that it is necessarily 
implied. This reasoning is eqqally fallacious. The power 
is not expressly granted to them-it remains with the leg-
islature. In the third instance they reason, or at least did 
so at the trial, from the aburdity that unless schools 
can be abandoned the board may be compelled to maintain 
a school with only one or two pupils and therefore they must 
have the power to discontinue the same. If they must have 
the power they ~hould go to the legislature and request it. 
Plaintiffs with equal show of logic could argue absurdum 
that under defendants theory the board in the interest of 
efficiency and economy and upon the recommendation of 
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction might build 
one large school in the center of the district and require 
all students from the entire district to attend. The answer 
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to this entire line of argument is that power does not root 
in arguments absurdum but in legislative grant. 
3. Whether the legislature should grant the power 
claimed by defendants, and if so under what terms and 
conditions, is not in issue on this appeal. Undoubtedly some 
power would be granted to them if the matter were submit-
ted to the legislature. 
4. The Utah legislature is in session at this hour. De-
fendants should be exemplars of the democratic philosophy. 
They should be the first to trust its processes and the last 
to circumvent them. Let the school officials go before the 
representatives of the people and submit their request. If 
they do this they will inspire the confidence and trust of 
citizens rather than their hatred and suspicion. Are the 
school officials afraid to submit their proposal to the free 
and open debate of our legislative assembly? In other 
states, almost without exception, the school officials have 
secured their grant of power in this fashion. See the cases 
analyzed in this Brief. 
5. Plato taught a philosophy in his Utopia which, writ 
large, has come in on the waves of centralized totalitarian-
ism. He advocated that children should be removed from 
their parents entirely and be taught by the state. That isn't 
American philosophy. Meyer v State of Nebraska, 262 U. 
S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042. The trend toward centralization is 
met in America by safeguards which our courts are ever 
alert to maintain. It is true we are accustomed to send 
our children away to college and even to high school but 
we are also accustomed to keep our children of tender years 
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under our protection and care, especially when we have ade-
quate school facilities for their instruction. These rights 
are as precious to the people of Elmo as to the people of 
larger communities.. To invade them was discriminatory, 
unreasonable, and unjust on the part of defendants. 
The trial court was correct in its rulings and its judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THERALD N. JENSEN, 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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